is unsystematic and infrequently subjected to close examination, and it usually remains almost entirely hidden from the analyst and his audience. When we talked informally to historians about this, they often replied by referring to their own craft skills. One implication of this paper is that it may be necessary for historians to attend more explicitly to the way in which their craft is exercised in compiling histories from the interpretative work of participants.
We believe that this suggestion will be found to be most convincing by those readers who are led to scrutinize their own current and not yet fully interpreted historical or sociological material in the light of our discussion and who are thereby made more sensitive to the highly variable interpretative work performed by their subjects. The pages above, then, are offered not as proving a case, but as identifying a series of issues worthy of consideration by historians as well as by sociologists of science.
In summarizing the implications for sociology of material similar to that presented here, we have argued that sociologists should pay much more attention to the nature of scientists' discourse instead of trying, with but little success, to use that discourse as the empirical basis for their own supposedly definitive versions of what is going on in science. The conclusions of this paper suggest that a historian's account will remain merely one among many plausible accounts. We are not suggesting, of course, that historians should cease constructing their own historical accounts; but rather, that they should take up the supplementary goal of describing and documenting the various repertoires and interpretative devices used by participants and, perhaps, of trying to explain how different repertoires and devices come to be adopted in different social settings and in different historical periods. is unsystematic and infrequently subjected to close examination, and it usually remains almost entirely hidden from the analyst and his audience. When we talked informally to historians about this, they often replied by referring to their own craft skills. One implication of this paper is that it may be necessary for historians to attend more explicitly to the way in which their craft is exercised in compiling histories from the interpretative work of participants. We believe that this suggestion will be found to be most convincing by those readers who are led to scrutinize their own current and not yet fully interpreted historical or sociological material in the light of our discussion and who are thereby made more sensitive to the highly variable interpretative work performed by their subjects. The pages above, then, are offered not as proving a case, but as identifying a series of issues worthy of consideration by historians as well as by sociologists of science.
In summarizing the implications for sociology of material similar to that presented here, we have argued that sociologists should pay much more attention to the nature of scientists' discourse instead of trying, with but little success, to use that discourse as the empirical basis for their own supposedly definitive versions of what is going on in science. The conclusions of this paper suggest that a historian's account will remain merely one among many plausible accounts. We are not suggesting, of course, that historians should cease constructing their own historical accounts; but rather, that they should take up the supplementary goal of describing and documenting the various repertoires and interpretative devices used by participants and, perhaps, of trying to explain how different repertoires and devices come to be adopted in different social settings and in different historical periods. This, then, is Gilbert and Mulkay's "inclusive" program of discourse analysis: in addition to our usual historical projects we should describe and explain the situated variability of scientists' talk. If this were all that was implied, there would be nothing with which to quarrel. Unfortunately, this is not all. Gilbert and Mulkay have produced a series of other papers over the past few years in which they recommend something more radical and restrictive. It is entirely legitimate to discuss the "restrictive" program here, for the present paper cites without comment or correction the work advocating that program of research. Far from saying that historians should also examine talk, Gilbert and Mulkay's restrictive program says that we must only examine talk. Their "supplementary goal" of describing and explaining scientists' variable talk indicates one direction of work; in their restrictive program the goal of describing and explaining action and belief is said to be chimerical.2 Gilbert and Mulkay's restrictive program of discourse analysis raises issues of fundamental importance to historians and sociologists of science. It contains four elements: (1) an account of the existing practice of historians and (other) sociologists; (2) a diagnosis of irremediable flaws in that practice; (3) a statement that discourse analysis does not suffer from these defects; and (4) a claim to originality in the treatment of scientists' talk. I will very briefly indicate that all these elements contain mistakes.
1. In Gilbert and Mulkay's opinion all other "analysts" (historians and sociologists) seek to " 'tell it like it is' " in science; to say "this is the way things actually happen[ed]"; to offer "'definitive accounts of scientists' actions and beliefs' "; to produce the "one best version" of scientific episodes.3 One won- of their explanatory significance. The historian might well regard the most frequently encountered utterances as an unreliable account of a scientist's aims. 3. Gilbert and Mulkay's strictures do not apply to any one type of historical practice: to "externalism" versus "internalism," to the sociology of knowledge versus the history of ideas.7 They apply to all descriptive and explanatory enterprises whatsoever, to everyday speech, and, presumably, to the observation reports of the natural sciences. "It is simply impossible to produce definitive versions of scientists' actions and beliefs"; all that existing approaches to understanding have yielded is "an analytical impasse" and an "Analytical Tower of Babel." What "wise man," Gilbert and Mulkay ask, "does not retreat from" this "impasse"?8
Our release from this "impasse" is, according to Gilbert and Mulkay, their restrictive program of discourse analysis: not as a "supplementary goal" (as they say in the present paper), not as just another thing historians might do, but as a total replacement of all existing approaches to understanding science: "My formulation," Mulkay says, does not present scientific discourse as just another topic to be covered in this area. The analysis of discourse is being presented as an alternative to the more traditional concern with describing and explaining action and belief. . .
. [T]he traditional objective of describing and explaining what really happened has been abandoned and replaced with an attempt to describe the recurrent forms of discourse.9
The inconsistencies between restrictive and inclusive programs seem irreparable. In apparently more recently written papers, however, Mulkay and his collaborators present yet another claim: the analysis of discourse is to have "methodological" or "analytical" priority over traditional exercises; one has to do discourse analysis "at least initially. we should try asking: How do scientists construct their versions of what is going on in science?" This "more modest and more answerable" question "must be given analytical priority." We cannot know action and belief through talk; all we can do is to "reflect upon" the "patterned character" of talk itself. They say that the discourse analyst "is no longer required to go beyond the data."1 This is the crucial point: discourse analysis is offered as a form of theory-and interpretation-free historical and sociological practice.
Of course, in reality Gilbert and Mulkay are just like the historians and sociologists they condemn: they too "go beyond the data." Gilbert and Mulkay's work is constitutively interpretative. As Collins has already noted, scientists' talk is "no more or less transparent than any other data."'2 Take any quotation from Gilbert and Mulkay's present paper. What is it that makes it visible as an instance of "empiricist" or of "contingent" accounting? Try the experiment of reading their quotation 3, which Gilbert and Mulkay offer as "empiricist" talk, as riddled with "contingent" locutions. This reading is perfectly possible: the "contingencies" might involve what scientists know about the mentioned biochemists, what significance is accorded to their "working on their own," being "largely ignored," and so forth. I do not argue that Gilbert and Mulkay's interpretations are wrong, only that they are interpretations and not pure data. Discourse analysis is not, in this respect, qualitatively different from the sorts of practice Gilbert and Mulkay's restrictive program criticizes. Their recommended way out of our alleged "analytical impasse" cannot be travelled.
4. Finally, we have the claim that discourse analysis is a radically new initiative in the study of science. Gilbert and Mulkay say that their approach is "unusual," that is "presages a major conceptual change," that it is an alternative "to almost all prior work."13 Priority is not important. What is important is the availability of empirical studies from which historians might benefit. So far as Gilbert and Mulkay's restrictive program is concerned, one might well concede their claims to novelty and priority, although, as I have argued, their practice belies their recommendations not to "go beyond the data." So far as the more inclusive and liberal program of describing and explaining variable talk is concerned, Gilbert and Mulkay's claims to originality are hardly warranted. There are a number of such studies in the empirical literature, including a fine example by Mulkay himself. In that paper Mulkay analyzed scientists' talk about norms, explaining its variation in different contexts in terms of scientists' interests and audiences. This paper, presumably now repudiated by its author, represents a model of how attention to scientists' talk can be fruitfully integrated with the traditional historians' goals of describing and explaining action and belief.14 The historiographic issues involved in the analysis of talk are not trivial. Scientists' talk constitutes a major portion of historians' evidence, and a more reflective attitude to our handling of that evidence can only be a good thing. I have shown that, in practice, Gilbert and Mulkay offer historians not one but two programs for treating talk. Their restrictive program, if accepted, involves a radical narrowing of historians' goals and procedures. The more inclusive program can be, and has already been, assimilated into our normal range of descriptive and explanatory projects. The attractions of the inclusive program are already evident in historians' practice; the weaknesses of the restrictive program are ones of principle. It is therefore scarcely surprising that they have not been counterbalanced by any significant concrete achievements.
